This paper is about the longevity and resilience of the form of local government that emerged in England in the nineteenth century and took shape in the twentieth. The paper focuses on contrast between the flexibility of its outer organisational form and a more stable central core, the system of political management and bureaucratic control. This organisation has survived reorganisations, changes in functions, centralisation, privatisation, the imposition of quangos, local governance, community governance and latterly fiscal austerity by adapting to opportunities and meeting the continual need for administrative tasks at the local level. The service rather than democratic features of English local government has ensured its survival whereas other local organisations, such community government, the voluntary sector and quangos, have less capacity to compete. It is an extreme example of path dependence. * These ideas were first presented to a seminar, The New Localism, hosted by the Centre for the Study of British Politics and Public Life, Birkbeck, on 13 February 2013. I owe a debt to the participants at the event for their sympathetic reactions to my ideas. I thank Liz Richardson, one of the editors of Local Government Studies, for encouraging me to write up these ideas in a paper and to offer it for consideration in the anniversary issue.
sistence of an institution that is more remarkable for its longevity and instinct for survival then any incipient propensity to self-destruct. An institution that took shape in the later years of the nineteenth century survived and adapted to deal with large changes in the service provision, financing and successive reorganisations. The system that was strengthened by the local government reorganisation of 1972, and its associated reform of internal management, is still broadly in existence today, adapting to whatever political and economic situation it faces, which includes the fiscal austerity that has been in evidence since 2009. The reason for this persistence and resilience lies in the operation of a powerful central political core to management and policy-making in local government, which is largely untouched by changes to its external environment. The model of local government is based on the institutionalisation of party politics in a well-organised bureaucracy, and the granting of autonomy to a tier of officers in senior management roles. With its central operating system intact, local government is able to maintain a powerful role in local communities, and largely outlives and outperforms other institutions operating in the system of local governance. Local authorities can adapt to changes to the functions and finance of local government, where periods of reduction in influence can be succeeded by the acquisition of new roles and activities. In this way, the outward aspects of the organisation can alter massively, whilst the pattern of political management remains the more or less same in character. Moreover, with the ability to adapt, it is well placed to survive most inclement conditions that public sector organisations and their clients have ever faced, that of fiscal austerity, and as a result may emerge dominant over any other local competitor, triumphant in the 'swamp' of local politics and governance.
To make these arguments, this paper reviews the emergence of the English system of local political management and shows how this was solidified into place by the reforms of the 1970s. Using new institutionalist arguments, the paper argues that this created path dependence, and shut off other alternatives for local reform and democratisation. The paper argues that many writers on English local government make a mistake in believing that the change in functions and finance for local government, happening since the early 1980s, meant the demise of the institution itself, when as Atkinson and Wilks-Heeg (2000) argue, its energy was transplanted into new arenas. The attempt to reform local political management structures in 2000 largely enhanced this system. Finally, the paper reviews the current period, and argues that the period of community governance-or central attempts to sponsor it-is largely at an end. The Localism Act 2011 that gives powers to local communities and neighbourhoods, also enhances locally elected government delivering to it a number of freedoms. Local government continues to adapt acquiring functions to run local economic policy and administer council tax benefit. So the great survivor may be the only locally powerful institution remaining in localities and can rule without much central and community interference.
Origins
Textbooks on English local government often start with the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act (for example, Chandler, 2007) , which set up the system of local committees and created the legal entity of the local authority (Keith-Lucas, 1980) . It is the right place to begin because the act created an entity that could run local services and activities in an integrated fashion. The committee system was important for local government because it created a means of the political control of service delivery, but also a system that could be adapted to deal with new problems and services. New committees and their associated administration could be introduced relatively easily.
In this way, local government could create new responsibilities which it did during the 19th century, such as for local infrastructure and enterprise (Stoker, 1988) . With this basic structure it was possible for local government to be reformed but for the new entities to be recognisably local government units. So local government boundaries and functions have been successively reformed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But each time the organisation, structure and culture remain recognisable as English local government, distinct from that in other countries, and generated a model for other places to emulate. In the nineteenth century, the form of organisation suited the period of expansion of local government functions from private bills and sponsored activities; but more controversially it also was appropriate for the period of central state expansion and centralisation in the twentieth. This is where Robson and his colleagues were wrong about the demise of local government in the mid-twentieth century. They underestimated the flexibility of the structure that had been created. In the 1930s and 1940s the nationalisation of utilities and the creation of the welfare state, such as the National Health Service, appeared to emasculate English local government, but what happened was that the very expansion of the welfare state conferred new responsibilities that were delegated to local government underpinned by rising central financial support and general grants that did not hypothecate funding to particular activities or services. Although most of these services were under central control, there was little direct supervision by central government which allowed local authorities to get on with the job of administering services. This has been identified by many experts, such as Martin Loughlin who observed that the legal framework gave local government considerable autonomy (Loughlin et al., 1985; Loughlin, 1996) , or created a balance in central-local government relations as observed by Griffith (Griffith, 1966) . Output studies were able to document the discretion that local authorities were able to employ within this framework (Sharpe and Newton, 1984) . Local authorities just got on with the job of administering services efficiently and without a great deal of visibility to the public. This is what one prominent public figure described as sewage without tears.
1
One of the most salient aspects of English local government is the strength of party politics. Local government was the arena in which organised political parties developed, such as the Labour Party. One of the most powerful changes happening over a long period was the spread of party politics whereby most seats were contested by organised political parties (Gyford, 1985) . The number of independent candidates declined (Rallings and Thrasher, 1997) , and party groups controlled policy-making in councils, able to take control of the committees if they had a majority of the seats on the council (Copus, 2004) . The effect on decision-making has been to centralise power whereby the power structures within parties tend to be replicated in decisionmaking within councils because nothing of importance could happen without the approval of the party groups which met before committee meetings and authorised policy, and to whom the officers of the council reported. Of course there always has been a subtle relationship between local partly leadership and their supporters as studies have shown (Leach and Wilson, 2000) , and also considerable variation in the kinds of party groups; but it is still clear who ruled local politics in most large
English local authorities, with party decisions structuring the outputs.
The explosion of community power studies that happened in the 1970s supported this account of party domination of local government which contrasted with the more open and fractious politics of US cities (Newton, 1976) . Even the rise of coalition politics in local authorities did not disturb the means of exercising power as bargains between party groups took the place of the single party rule, but the political control of services and basic structure of the central of local government remained much the same (Temple, 1994) . Some of the community power studies were more explicit about the impact of party politics, such as Green's (1981) which showed that party politics not only dominated local politics but had driven out local elities, such as those from business. When parties had mass membership the exercise of power in local monopolies was not so problematic, but once those memberships dwindled as they did from the 1970s so the democratic linkage weakened. This was paralleled by an equivalent trend with the politics of the centre. Local politicians increasingly became local rather than national figures, partly because it was hard to be a successful politician and retain a local linkage, reinforced by the difficulty of holding national and local office at the same time, in particular from the rules of attendance of the House of Commons and local councils. The dual polity of Bulpitt's (1987) conception was in part an exaggeration, but had enough truth to be plausible for comparative enquiry (Page and Goldsmith, 1987) and case studies (Chandler and Kingdom, 1999) . Some commentators believe that central government civil servants and politicians exhibited a cultural distain for local government (Greenwood, 1981; Jones and Travers, 1996) .
These factors created an increasingly isolated organisation, at least politically, which had retreated into its bureaucratic empires, ensuring that local politics was about service delivery rather than promoting democracy. This is the sympathetic critique John Stewart makes of English local government (Stewart, 2000) . What had happened to local government was that its bureaucracies had increased in size and it had become more professionalised, with cadres of expert officers. What dominated local government were these service empires linked by intra-professional networks (Young and Mills, 1983) . This meshed well with political control, because the heads of service and the chairs of committees formed a close alliance to govern councils, so rather than bureaucratic elites dominating local government or excessive political control, a joint elite governed local authorities, sharing power (Blowers, 1980) . Most community power studies of English local authorities backed this view up (Saunders, 1979 ) with others stressing more complex relationship within local authorities (Stoker and Wilson, 1986) . In spite of pressure groups being part of local government (Newton, 1976; Stoker and Wilson, 1991) , they remained dominated by local authority polices and funding.
Reorganisation
Most of the trends described in the last section were well entrenched by the end of the 1960s. In fact, such a pattern is to be expected if the path dependent argument is goingto be take seriously. In that sense much of what has happened to local government during the twentieth century has been endogenous, part of selfreinforcing system the keeps the same kind of behaviours and institutions on track.
In that sense, what is described in this section might be seen as the consequence of the form of organisation rather than a cause of it. However the reorganisation of the period that occurred during the 1960s and 1970s whereby local government was 
Centralisation
As with the 1930s, the 1980s was regarded by many as a point of transition for local government: the final move from a period of local-self government to one where local government had become an agency doing the bidding of central government. There were important changes to be sure, but they illustrate the thesis of adaptation and survival rather than diminution and fall from power. The changes were profound of course, and drove from the large financial cuts of the late 1970s and also the growing concern by those in central government about the quality of services, particular for education (John, 1989) . This well-told story is of a more ideologically driven government wanting to implement more radical policies, which involved introducing more competition for services and transforming a more bureaucratic organisation at the local level (see Butcher et al., 1990) . A key factor in the conflict was the radicalisation of local politics by mainly left parties, which (relating to the theme of this paper) had used the command structure of local government to introduce new policies (Gyford, 1985; Boddy and Fudge, 1984) . In the face of the new conflict, the government tightened spending controls (Travers, 1986) and introduced more precise legal controls over local government (Loughlin, 1996) . To ensure that change happened on the ground, central government took functions away and created local organisations, such as urban development corporations to run local services of planning and housing, and to carry out entrepreneurial activities (Imrie and Thomas, 1999 ). There followed a succession of central sponsored organisations such as city technology colleges, housing action trusts, training and enterprise councils to name a few, so much so that it was thought that a local state was being created based on non-elected organisations Skelcher (1998) . It was not surprising that many commentators thought these reforms amounted to a radical change to local government (Cochrane, 1993; Loughlin et al., 1985; Butcher et al., 1990) . Foundations and research councils commissioned research and reports that investigated the demise of local government (for example, Carter and John, 1992) .
Even at the time many experts did not really believe that local government had been radically centralised even though the changes were important. At the end of the 1980s local government had much the same level of finance as at the beginning of the decade (Travers, 1989) . Broadly the same functions remained. The long list of acts that were frequently seen as evidence of centralisation were in fact comprised mainly of a series of minor amendments and consolidations of existing legislation (John, 1994, 416, n. 28 ). The more radical reforms, such as the poll tax proved temporary and never had a massive impact on local accountability (Butler et al., 1994) . Accounts of central-local relations stressed the complexity of implementing top-down reforms, which were processed and modified by implementing organisations (Rhodes, 1988; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992) . Studies of local governance found that local government was far from being marginalised, it was at the central of new networks of collaborative governance, as the most powerful and legitimate form of local governance (Stoker, 2000) . Local government was at the centre of partnerships, such as local regimes (Harding, 1997) . In the shifting sands of local policy networks, it was locally elected government that had the resources, capacity and legitimacy to lead local networks, and give a focus to policy-making, as many case studies of local policy networks show (Cole and John, 2001 (Imrie and Thomas, 1999) . These organisations realised that they needed to cultivate good relationships with local authorities if they were to achieve their objectives. The term centralisation or decentralisation was hard to apply in such a complex and adaptive environment (John, 1994) . What was happening in the UK, with the rise of stronger local leaders, partnerships, decentralisation and Europeanisation,
was not so different to developments in other parts of Europe (John, 2001 ). All through this time the same system of political management continued, unaffected by the Widdicombe reforms designed to curtain the excesses of party politics, which it learnt to negotiate (Leach et al., 1999) .
Modernisation and New Labour
Many of the same contradictions in central-local politics continued under Labour, which was in power in the centre from 1997-2010. New Labour wanted to promote local democracy with its slogan of new localism (Corry and Stoker, 2002) and to revive local leadership. But it also wished to ensure strong control over the quality of services through performance monitoring, such as the Best Value Regime and Comprehensive Performance Assessment. The result was a contradictory set of policies, but which were not controversial in a period of increasing public funding for local government. Rather than leading to problems for the organisational entity of English local government, these conditions helped the persistence-even the enhancementof the political-manangement centre that had survived for so long in the years from 1974-1997. The service bureaucracy became adept at using the performance management system leading to improvement in measured performance each year (Boyne et al., 2010) .
It was the reform of the council constitutions that proved to be local government's finest hour. The modernisation reforms, introduced in the Local Government Act 2000, were intended to be a threat to the cosy and hidden world of local political management. They were designed to open up local government through providing stronger leadership and greater accountably, in particular by instituting directly elected mayors, but more generally by creating cabinets and better structures for review and accountability. But just with all the other reforms, local government adapted to the changes and made them their own (Gains et al., 2005) . There were few mayors elected, partly from the lack of enthusiasm from within local government, and the cabinets that have come to dominate local government largely extend and formalise the party elite systems of political management whereas the forms of scrutiny are largely ineffective. Essentially the same system of local government management carried on as before, and was even strengthened by the reforms (Gains et al., 2007) .
The main gainers from the reform were the bureaucrats who were able to enhance their desired form of organisation and work more closely with the senior politicians (Gains et al., 2008) . Even though the period of New Labour coincided with the pop-ularity of forms of decentralisation and governance beyond local government, what was called double devolution, where many terms described decentralisation beyond local government-community governance, empowerment, community leadership to name a few-in fact most services remained with local government. and it significant that he is a local government politician and the stability of portfolios under the coalition means he is in post for a long time.
Fiscal Austerity and Localism
As central government looks to respond to weak economic growth, it turns to the adaptable entity once more which can efficiently deliver services in exchange for
funding. This was shown by the publication, Local growth: realising every places potential, Cm 7961, October 2010. The government has created City Deals which hand to local government the responsibility for leading growth. There are a range of measures on local taxation and growth that give more capacity to act, such as the New Homes Bonus and Community Infrastructure Levy as well as freedoms in certain areas through Enterprise Zones. In a move that replicates past exercises in pragmatism, local government gets council tax benefit to administer, but with a ten per cent reduction in funding that it has to meet. Central government for a century and half has been happy to give locally elected authorities certain administrative tasks that it does not want to carry out itself because they are troublesome or political contentious or both, which allows it to shift blame to local government if it needs to.
The Coalition is no different to its predecessors in this respect. As a multifunctional organisation, local government is happy to acquire these new activities, even on what appear to be poor terms of trade, because it enhances the sum of activities it is control of.
The spending cuts are having a massive impact on services but there are a few points to have in mind. As Travers concludes, local government has been well managed financially in previous decades (Travers, 2012, 14) , which means that it is well placed to implement the cuts, so that the central core of activities remains in place.
The effect of the cuts on the other organisations in the system of local governance, and the voluntary sector is likely to be severe (NCVO, 2013) , and it is possible they will face greater percentage reductions and this can undermine small organisations.
In inclement conditions, it is the larger organisations that have the capacity to survive. In any case, the attempt to revive community governance under the rubric of the Big Society is not likely to achieve large changes in community mobilisation (Ishkanian and Szreter, 2012) . As a result of all the initiatives since 2010, it is unlikely that community organisations will be a counterweight to the power of local authorities.
Discussion and Conclusion
In the language of the new institutionalism English local government displays a high level of path dependence. An equilibrium had emerged during the twentieth century whereby the service-focused and pragmatic impulse of local political institutions fitted well with the environment of central politics. Given a relatively nationalised political culture and centralised political parties, there was no room for a powerful locally elected and transformative local government, especially after the welfare state had been extended in the 1950s. But there was a role for an organisation which has itself political control but is content to adapt and reform to the demand for services that are needed at any point in time, either from central convenience, or from local initiative. This context ensures local authorities continue to run a large array of public services, and a keep accessing a supply of offloaded activities from the centre.
The arrangement continued over time, reinforcing the internal characteristics of local government organisations. When this approach to decentralisation worked well, the main controversies in local-central relationships were rarely ideological but about distribution of benefits and managing the complex form of delegated administration.
Thus there were good conditions for the survival of this form of local government, helped by its ingrained habit of compromise and pragmatism honed over two centuries, and was only occasionally interrupted by more assertive form of politics, such as with the Poplar dispute of 1921, or by the leftist councils in the 1970s and 1980s.
Local government has benefited from continual opportunities in this environment that the successive governments have provided, including the one elected in 2010.
The path dependence comes from the negative feedback in the system: because local government is efficient at what it does, it drove out other proposals for reform and possible alternative models. The standard operating procedures that got established in the 1950s were reinforced over time.
All this is consistent with institutional accounts of politics (see Pierre et al., 2008; Peters, 2012) , in particular a version of this approach that not only stress the salience of formal powers but the informal routines and habits that create path dependence.
In the 1980s and 1990s academics had correctly reacted against a old institutionalist view of local politics in which formal structures were thought to dominate. But, in their enthusiasm for the study of networks and community governance, they may have neglected the vital links between the formal and informal power. Stoker highlights this in his use of the terms from the study of international relations, that of hard and soft power (Stoker, 2011) . This is what comparative studies of local governance had discovered: the networks and search for better policies always led back to local government, where local authorities understood about how to manage the relationship between hard and soft power, and crafted different patterns of local leadership to balance out local interests (Cole and John, 2001) . Writers on the power of institutions in local politics, such as Lowndes (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013) , have outlined the importance of these routines. The politicians and officers, socialised in their cultures, pass on these values and assumptions. Working in the same buildings and operating in similar organisational structures to those created in 1972, it is no surprise that path dependence describes the history of local government in turbulent times.
As citizens we might be pleased that England has a relatively efficient and adaptable multifunctional organisation that is capable of handling most things in pragmatic way, rarely willing or able to put up a fight against central government. It does not have the heavy hitting power local mayors that can be seen in some European counties, but local government is political if quietly so. Nor does England have complex layers of subnational government to deal with as it has a simplified system of large either single or two tier local authorities. But there are costs in this equilibrium trap in that other potential actors are shut out of this form of decision-making whether the backbench councillor, the community group or the citizen. Community representation has foundered on the resistance of local authorities, with some honourable exceptions (Cotterill and Richardson, 2011; Richardson, 2012) . The very effectiveness of local government, its very pragmatism, which is the source of path dependence, may obstruct the emergence of a more exciting and energetic local politics.
